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I. INTRODUCTION
"Reproduction after death" is an anomaly of sorts. This notion is not an
entirely new concept;' however, it is a process that only realized its full poten-
tial in recent years.2 Modem advances in reproductive science, increasing the
success rates and usage of related procedures, have caused a shortcoming in the
law with regards to its ability to dispose of cases and issues caused by these
contemporary changes.4 More specifically, the growing popularity of posthum-
ous conception causes a predicament when deciding the extent of the child's
right to inherit from the deceased parent' and right to receive other benefits such
6
as Social Security.
Science has caught up to and passed the limits of what the current law,
at least in states such as West Virginia,' can appropriately handle concerning the
posthumously conceived child. Therefore, the time is upon West Virginia for a
change in its law to adequately address the issues related to posthumous concep-
tion in such a way that meets the needs of interested parties and is in accord
with current social policy.
Several states have made decisions concerning posthumous conception.
However, some of those states only dealt with the issue by means of adjudica-
tion as the cases were presented.8 In order to prevent uncertainty upon presenta-
tion of a posthumous conception case, the West Virginia legislature must
I Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Conceiving the Inconceivable: Legal Recognition of the Posthu-
mously Conceived Child, 34 ACTEC J. 154, 155 (2008) (explains that the ability to freeze sperm
was discovered by an Italian scientist, Mantegazza, in 1866).
2 Michael K. Elliot, Tales of Parenthood From the Crypt: The Predicament of the Posthu-
mously Conceived Child, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47,51(2004).
3 See id.
4 See id. at 50.
Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address Equal Pro-
tection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 234, 255
(2005).
6 Kristine S. Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem Conception, and Intestacy, 53 U. KAN.
L. REv. 627, 628 (2005).
7 See infra Part IV.
9 See infra Part V.A.1-3.
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preemptively act by altering West Virginia Code section 42-1-8,9 which deals
with descent and distribution. An alteration in this statute will prevent a future
debacle on the bench in terms of deciding how best to interpret the inheritance
rights of a posthumously conceived child.
Part II of this Note provides background and a history of the develop-
ment of posthumous conception and its intricacies, leading to the complex legal
issues related thereto. Part III considers externalities such as constitutional rights
to post-mortem reproduction, property rights of ownership, the rule against per-
petuities, and each of these items' effect on the rights of posthumously con-
ceived children. Then, Part IV examines West Virginia's relevant statute, sec-
tion 42-1-8, and highlights its inadequacies as they relate to the posthumously
conceived child. Part V includes a case study and comparison of current statutes
addressing the rights of posthumously conceived children, which is necessary in
order to provide West Virginia with a breadth of experience and samples upon
which to base its own decision on how best to deal with this issue.
A critique of select states' current statutes, specifically geared towards
posthumously conceived children, will explain differences, as well as provide a
cost-benefit analysis of the various approaches to the posthumous conception
dilemma. Finally, after noting controlling public policy concerns, Part VI offers
a recommendation as to where West Virginia needs to go in order to most effec-
tively handle posthumously conceived children's rights to inheritance and re-
ceipt of other benefits. Ultimately, this Note argues that a posthumously con-
ceived child should be able to inherit from all living members of the decedent's
family except for the decedent himself, with no time restraints, so long as the
decedent provides explicit, written consent.
II. BACKGROUND: WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM AND WHERE ARE WE
GOING?
Despite the seemingly obvious nature of what constitutes a posthumous-
ly conceived child and where he or she comes from, there exists a convoluted
set of problems that must be addressed in order to fully grasp the dilemmas the
law must address concerning posthumously conceived children and inheritance.
Some of these dilemmas relate to basic definitional confusion over what and
who the posthumously conceived child is, thus creating a problem of over-
generalization with regards to differentiating the posthumously conceived child
from the posthumously born child. Furthermore, it is easy to presume, as some
states apparently do, that prior, outdated statutes' 0 and case law will sufficiently
control the rights of the posthumously conceived child to inherit and receive
other benefits. However, there is an entirely new element placed in the equation
when dealing with posthumous conception that is not addressed by older statutes
9 The title of West Virginia Code section 42-1-8 is "Posthumous children to take." W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2010).
10 See, e.g., id.
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that typically only address posthumous birth. An elementary understanding of
these concepts and some of the related legal implications is imperative for a full
appreciation of the inadequacy of West Virginia's current statute" dealing with
descent and distribution to posthumous children.
A. "Posthumously Born" vs. "Posthumously Conceived": What's the Dif-
ference?
A fundamental distinction exists between the child that is posthumously
born and the child that is posthumously conceived. Some might consider the
distinction obvious; however, the legal ramifications of the differences are not
so simple. Posthumously born children, often times referred to as "posthumous
children,"1 2 are children conceived before, but born after one of their parents'
deaths. Posthumously conceived children are not only born after, but also con-
ceived after, the death of one of their parents.13
A child only born posthumously is, in most states (including West Vir-
ginia), considered "in being" at the time of conception. 14 Therefore, that child,
for inheritance purposes, is considered to be alive ("in being") at the time of the
parent's death and, consequently, will take as a child already born at the time of
the parent's death.15 However, this is not the case with the posthumously con-
ceived child, who is not "in being" at the time of the parent's death because the
child has not yet been conceived. Consequently, an entirely different set of des-
cent and distribution legislation and case law is necessary in order to specifical-
ly deal with the issues16 related to the posthumously conceived child.
The considerations regarding the rights of posthumously conceived
children are more complex because of the post-mortem nature of the children's
creation, mandating close scrutiny of the intentions, rights, and any testate dis-
positions of the decedent-parent. Again, a foundational understanding of the
differences between commonly mistaken terms provides a clearer comprehen-
sion of the multitude of external factors to be. considered with posthumously
conceived children that can be overlooked with posthumously born children.
" Id.
12 See, e.g., id. (the title of this code section is "Posthumous children to take," however, the
code section only addresses posthumously born children, not posthumously conceived children).
13 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 117 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed.
2009).
14 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (permitting inheritance by "[a]ny child in the womb of its
mother at, and which may be born after, the death of the intestate").
1 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 117.
16 See infra Part Ill.
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B. Assisted Reproduction and its Effect on the Post-Mortem World1 7
An overview of some of the most common forms of reproductive assis-
tance and their relation to posthumous conception is helpful in gaining an un-
derstanding of the legal issues implicated by these procedures. More specifical-
ly, upon understanding the mechanisms involved in this process, one can better
see the bigger picture of the legal rights to ownership and reproduction that the
donor of genetic material might assert in a related case.
1. Artificial Insemination
"Artificial insemination ("Al") is probably the most common and wide-
spread reproductive assistance technique."18 Al involves the placement of sperm
"either into the vagina, uterus, or fallopian tubes of a woman with a syringe. The
sperm can be fresh or thawed, cryopreserved sperm. It may come from an ano-
nymous donor or from the husband of the woman being inseminated."1 9 Its pop-
ularity can be attributed to simplicity, cost efficiency, and relatively high suc-
cess rates. 2 0 Furthermore, Al may be conducted from "home without the assis-
tance of a physician."2 1
With its first successful procedure dating back to 1770, the concept of
Al is not a newfound invention.22 However, it was not until over two centuries
later, on June 4, 1986, that AI was performed in the United States using a frozen
ovum.23 It is easier to understand why the law currently lags24 in its ability to
handle posthumously conceived child cases when viewed in light of the recent
25
nature of the procedure's more advanced capabilities.
2. In Vitro Fertilization and Cryopreservation
"In vitro fertilization ("IVF") is a process in which eggs are extracted
from a woman's ovaries, the extracted eggs are fertilized in a lab with sperm,
and the fertilized eggs are then inserted back into the woman's uterus through
the cervix."26 IVF does not have as high of a success rate as Al. 27
17 "Today going to the fertility clinic for a procedure is as commonplace as going to one's
family doctor for a cold." Elliot, supra note 2, at 51.
18 Id. at 52.
9 Goodwin, supra note 5, at 238.
20 See id.
21 Elliot, supra note 2, at 52.
22 Goodwin, supra note 5, at 238.
23 Elliot, supra note 2, at 51.
24 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2010); see also infra Part IV.
25 See Goodwin, supra note 5, at 238.
26 Id. at 239.
2011] 243
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"Cryopreservation is the general term used to describe the process of
freezing different reproductive material, including gametes, zygotes, pre-
embryos, and embryos. It is the key process that makes assisted reproductive
technology possible after one parent has already died." 28 Cryopreservation is
believed to maintain sperm's viability for at least ten years, and some research-
ers even suggest its ability to maintain sperm for up to one hundred years.2 9 The
process dates back to 1949 when scientists discovered that adding glycerol to
frozen sperm worked to preserve the sperm's viability. 30 This process is the
means by which posthumous conception becomes possible, therefore solidifying
its stake in the current, related dilemmas.
C. The Reasons to Use and Consequences of Posthumous Conception
Discussing the development of the procedures that make posthumous
conception possible raises the question of why a person would choose to utilize
posthumous conception. There are a vast number of benefits and motivations
behind relying on this form of reproduction. Therefore, it is necessary to men-
tion the considerations a potential parent of a posthumously conceived child
makes from the perspectives of both the surviving spouse and the decedent-
donor. Granted, posthumous conception does not necessarily occur in the spous-
al setting. It is an available option for non-married persons who are seeking an
anonymous donor's sperm for conception. 3 1 However, those anonymous scena-
rios are beyond the scope of this Note. Here, the focus is on the rights of both
the posthumously conceived child and his or her known parents' rights..
1. Right to Inherit
If a child is already born at the time of the decedent parent's death, then
there is no question as to the right to inherit by means of intestacy or a specific
devise within a will. Furthermore, many states provide, statutorily, for a child's
inheritance rights even in the case of being posthumously born, but who were
conceived before the decedent parent's death.3 2
However, states that have specifically dealt with the right of a posthu-
mously conceived child to inherit, either through intestacy or testacy, are few in
number. 33 Inheritance rights also implicate other convoluted considerations re-
27 Id.
28 Id. at 237 (footnotes omitted).
29 Id.
30 Elliot, supra note 2, at 51.
31 Goodwin, supra note 5, at 238.
32 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2010).
3 As of the spring of 2010, only twelve states have enacted statutes specifically addressing the
rights of posthumously conceive children. Morgan Kirkland Wood, It Takes a Village: Consider-
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garding policy, certainty, and efficiency.3 4 Consequently, a potential parent of a
posthumously conceived child must strongly consider the laws of the state in
which they are domiciled in order to predict the degree of protection their post-
humously conceived child will receive.
In West Virginia, as in any other state, a parent likely wants his or her
posthumously conceived child to inherit from the deceased parent's estate. An
inheritance, similar to receipt of Social Security benefits, is a mechanism for
providing for the well-being of dependent persons. A posthumously conceived
child is a dependent, just as any other child of the deceased parent, and has no
control over its post-mortem conception. Stemming from this concern are the
constitutional considerations of equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.35 It is logical for a parent to assume that any child born from the
genetic material of his or her deceased spouse will have a natural right to inherit
from his or her biological parent. But, as discussed below, there are countervail-
ing interests that must be balanced into the equation as well.
2. Financial Benefits
Although the scope of this Note focuses primarily on the rights of post-
humously conceived children to inherit, it is necessary to briefly mention the
Social Security aspect of the posthumously conceived child dilemma. Much of
the current case law3 6 concerning posthumously conceived children revolves
around the rights of posthumously conceived children to receive Social Security
benefits through the decedent parent. Thus, it is important to establish a basic
understanding of this issue in order to fully comprehend all related aspects of
the problem.
A parent makes the logical presumption that any and all of their child-
ren will receive benefits (inheritance and Social Security) from their deceased
parent. As stated by the mother (the surviving spouse) from Woodward v. Com-
missioner of Social Security,3 7 in support of her posthumously conceived child-
ren receiving Social Security benefits, "[1]ook at them and tell me that's not
right."3 8 Parents naturally presume that their children, who are products of the
same genetic suppliers, are equal in all regards and retain equal rights. There-
fore, the desire to receive Social Security and any other financial benefits for a
posthumously conceived child is an expected sentiment of the child's parents. .
ing the Other Interests at Stake When Extending Inheritance Rights to Posthumously Conceived
Children, 44 GA. L. REv. 873, 890-95 (2010); see infra Part V.B.
34 Elliot, supra note 2, at 64-65.
35 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUnONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 684-85 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011); see
also infra Part III.G.
See infra Part V.A.
3 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
3 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 119.
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However, there is an important distinction in the governing law when
considering Social Security benefits versus rights of inheritance: "[t]he Social
Security Act is federal legislation." 39 Therefore, the law governing the rights of
posthumously conceived children's access to these benefits is controlled at the
federal level, which will override some state laws related to access to benefits
by surviving children. 4 0 But, "[t]he provisions that allow surviving children of a
deceased, qualifying worker to receive benefits do involve state law in defining
who is a surviving child .. .. " Consequently, state laws, defining a valid "sur-
viving child" are implicated in this federal scheme, further accentuating the
need for statutory reform at the state level.
3. Security in One's Ability to Reproduce
An additional benefit of posthumous conception is the opportunity to
form a security blanket over a person's ability to procreate. For many people,
the ability to reproduce with their chosen partner is one of the most sacred
choices ever made. However, certain obstacles and potential dangers to this
choice inevitably present themselves within one's lifetime. These dangers may
come in the form of a hazardous job, disease, unexpected disasters, and any
harm members of the armed forces face during service.42 Therefore, many
people find security in being able to preserve their genetic material, to be used
in the event of one of the aforementioned circumstances by their surviving
spouse or designated surrogate.
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILD
A vast array of legal issues arises from the birth of a posthumously con-
ceived child. These issues require efficient disposition in order to most effec-
tively provide for the well-being of the child, a polestar concern in cases related
to posthumous conception. 4 3 This Note narrows its scope to the legal conse-
quences of posthumous conception related to inheritance and other rights of the
child to receive support benefits." A brief overview of the legal ramifications
3 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006) ("Old-age and survivors insurance benefit payments" section of the
federal Social Security Act); Laurence C. Nolan, Critiquing Society's Response to the Needs of
Posthumously Conceived Children, 82 OR. L. REv. 1067, 1100 (2003) (emphasis added).
40 Nolan, supra note 39, at 1101. "Congress can act independently of state legislatures in pro-
viding for the welfare of posthumously conceived children whose deceased parent died an insured
worker under the Act." Id.
41 Id. at 1100.
42 See Lorio, supra note 1, at 155 (discussing some of the motivations causing people to pre-
serve their genetic material).
43 Nolan, supra note 39, at 1090.
4 These issues require a special focus on state descent and distribution law. See, e.g., W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-2 (LexisNexis 2010).
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most likely to be encountered in these types of cases is imperative for an under-
standing of what West Virginia must consider in deciding how to revise its cur-
rent legislation.
A. The Parent-Child Relationship
"The primary legal issue facing posthumously conceived children is
whether there exists a parent-child relationship between the child and the de-
ceased parent, even in cases where the parents were married to each other." 45
The decedent parent, who donated his or her genetic material, is unquestionably
the biological parent of the posthumously conceived child. However, complica-
tions arise when determining whether a legal parent-child relationship exists for
purposes of inheritance and receipt of other support benefits.4 6
Under common law, in order to inherit, heirs had to be determined at the
time of the decedent's death.47 However, even at common law, children who
were in gestation at the time of the decedent's death but were born within nine
months of the decedent's death were treated as being alive at the time of the
decedent's death, thus permitting them to inherit. 48 Then, in 2002, the Uniform
Parentage Act ("UPA") "was amended to allow for a posthumous child to be
considered a child of the deceased parent 'if the deceased spouse consented in a
record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased indi-
vidual would be a parent of the child."' 4 9 These variations in the law illustrate
attempts, which seem to favor recognition of a legal parent-child relationship, to
adapt to the changing needs of posthumously conceived children.
Thus, there have been attempts at reconciling existing, original statutes
with the developing needs of posthumously conceived children that were not as
readily apparent at the time the original statutes were promulgated. But many of
the existing state statutes, despite curative attempts by model Acts like the UPA,
retain potential interpretive5 0 complications because the statutes' language
leaves an opening for an interpretation that only gives posthumously born child-
ren certain rights, but not posthumously conceived children. 5 ' These ambiguous
openings must be addressed.
Because the decedent's estate is distributed to the living heirs of the de-
cedent at the time of the decedent's death, the question of what constitutes a
valid parent-child relationship at that time is paramount. There are various ar-
guments for the establishment of a legal parent-child relationship with regards to
45 Nolan, supra note 39, at 1072.
46 See id.
47 Goodwin, supra note 5, at 254.
48 Id.
49 Lorio, supra note 1, at 160.
50 See id
51 E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2010).
2011] 247
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the posthumously conceived child. The arguments take into consideration social
policy concerning the needs of the child and surviving parent as well as the var-
ious interests of the state, such as efficient closure of the decedent's estate.5 2
The positions assumed by the parties in the case of Woodward v. Com-
missioner of Social Security 53 are illustrative of some of the arguments related
to the parent-child relationship in the posthumously conceived child context. On
one side, "[t]he wife's principal argument [was] that, by virtue of their genetic
connection with the decedent, posthumously conceived children must always be
permitted to enjoy the inheritance rights of the deceased parent's children under
our law of intestate succession." 5 4 In rebuttal to the wife's position, the govern-
ment argued that "because posthumously conceived children are not 'in being'
as of the date of the parent's death, they are always barred from enjoying such
inheritance rights."55 The court in that case ruled in favor of the mother; howev-
er, it did not do so until after it had conducted a thorough analysis of the rele-
vant intestacy laws of its state.56
The mother in Woodward assumes a position strongly aligned with the
best interest of her children. Furthermore, the mother asserts a social policy
stance seeking an equitable result because the children are genetically related to
the father, thus the children naturally should assume the rights to support as any
other child because "it seems right."58
As a side note, and at a moral level, the mother's seemingly zealous ad-
vocacy for her children's rights raises questions as to the possibility of ulterior
motives, such as her attempt to realize financial incentives for herself. Under the
Social Security Act, 9 as it stands today, the child and the surviving spouse re-
ceive benefits from a secured, deceased spouse-parent.60 Therefore, although it
may seem brash by some to even think of the possibility that a mother would
exploit her children as a means to reap personal financial gains, it would be
naYve not to realize this possibility. Cast in that light, the arguments against a
mother filing for the Social Security benefits of a posthumously conceived child
are slightly more palatable, or at least understandable.
One commentator emphasized the repercussions of not establishing a
legal parent-child relationship between the posthumously conceived child and
his or her genetic parent:
52 Elliot, supra note 2, at 64-65.
5 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
54 Id at 262.
s5 Id.
56 Id. at 262-70.
5 See id. at 262.
58 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 119 (quoting the mother of the posthumously con-
ceived children in the Woodward case).
59 42 U.S.C.A. § 402 (West 2011).
6 Knaplund, supra note 6, at 632.
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Without the recognition of a parent-child relationship, the post-
humously conceived child forfeits many of the benefits derived
from that relationship. The child cannot inherit by intestate suc-
cession from the deceased parent or inherit through intestate
succession from the deceased parent's own parents, the grand-
parents, or other collateral relations. Similarly, the posthumous-
ly conceived child does not have the right to claim to be a pre-
termitted heir in states that allow children, under certain cir-
cumstances, who are omitted from a parent's will still to share
in the parent's estate. The common law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties also works to their detriment. They do not qualify to receive
survivor's benefits from the deceased parent's social security,
pension, insurance, or worker's compensation. They would
most likely be ineligible to receive wrongful death recoveries.6 1
There are a myriad of reasons for establishing the legal parent-child re-
lationship between a posthumously conceived child and his or her genetic par-
ent. Not establishing that relationship effectively abandons the child in such a
way that surely runs contrary to the best interest of the child, which is of course
one of the state's primary interests.62 Additionally, not permitting the child to
inherit via intestacy from his or her parents obligates the state and federal gov-
ernment to care for the child through their already depleted support programs. 6 3
Conversely, the state maintains a colorful counterargument to posthu-
mously conceived children inheriting from their deceased genetic parents and
receiving other support benefits. Primarily, the state maintains a strong interest
in efficient closure of the decedent's estate. 4 If a state's probate courts are re-
quired to leave an estate open for an inordinate amount of time, numerous com-
plications will arise related to certainty, predictability, and efficient distribution
of the decedent's estate to heirs living at the time of the decedent's death who
might be in immediate need of their inheritances.6 5
61 Nolan, supra note 39, at 1075-76 (footnotes omitted).
62 Id. at 1068. "The tenor of any legislation should be based on the welfare of these children,
and secondarily on any other policies." Id.
Elliot, supra note 2, at 65 ("[T]he children will become wards of the state in an already
overburdened welfare society."); Stephen Ohlemacher, Social Security, Medicare Rapidly Being
Depleted, LJWORLD.COM (May 13, 2009), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2009/may/13/social-
security-medicare-rapidly-being-depleted/ (discussing the projected decline in Social Security
funding as the baby boomer generation continues to age).
6 Elliot, supra note 2, at 64-65.
65 See id; Nolan, supra note 39, at 1091-92.
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B. Post-Mortem Property Rights of the Donor-Parent
To what degree does the law permit a person to bequeath his or her ge-
netic material to his or her spouse, and then continue controlling the use of his
or her genetic material post-mortem? This vexing question is a reminder that
courts and legislatures must also consider the rights of the donor-parent, not just
the child. A person may bequeath his or her property,- real and personal, to
whomever he or she pleases upon his or her death.66 However, bequeathing ge-
netic material to be used posthumously implicates a whole new set of concerns,
such as the establishment of parentage, the extent of the legatee's control over
the property, and the power to destroy the genetic material.
Ultimately, whether the deceased donor desires to provide for the post-
humously conceived child or not, the decedent is the biological parent of the
child, which involves certain aspects of the child's rights to support. Even when
the parent provides explicit provisions for, and consents to, providing for the
child posthumously, it is important to consider whether social policy lends itself
towards requiring the donor-parent to provide for the child. Professor Laurence
C. Nolan points out that there could be certain time limits on how long a de-
ceased parent's genetic material should be used, due to unforeseen changes in
circumstances, before being destroyed.6 7 Additionally, the "dead hand" of the
testator continuing to control his or her property after death presents a conflict
of interests between the property rights of the decedent and the efficient closure
of estates by the state.68
Consent of the decedent-donor appears to be one of the overwhelming
concerns related to the decedent's rights. "As the Massachusetts Supreme Court
noted in Woodward, the concern here is for the decedent's procreative rights; he
should not be forced to have a child without his consent."6 9 Although the court
in Woodward is discussing the rights of the deceased parent to procreate, there
is a relation to his property rights because both deal with consent. Therefore,
uncertainties related to the posthumously conceived child's right to inherit can
be eliminated with properly documented consent of the deceased parent explicit-
66 See generally Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (establishment of a property interest in
the right to transfer property at death via the Just Compensation Clause); DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 1-15.
67 Telephone Interview with Laurence C. Nolan, Professor of Law, Howard Univ. (Feb. 9,
2011).
68 The issue of the "dead hand" in estate distribution involves the decedent having too much
control over the use of his or her property post-mortem, and the limits that must be placed on this
control without infringing on the right to dispose of one's property freely. DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 27 (discussing the problems of the "dead hand" in estate distribution).
69 Knaplund, supra note 6, at 650; Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 269
(Mass. 2002).
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ly stating his intent to become a parent through his bequeathed genetic materi-
al.70
Despite having the consent of the deceased parent, it is important to
recognize the perpetual possibility of the circumstances under which the dece-
dent gave consent changing. When this happens, to what extent should the de-
cedent's original consent be treated as controlling authority? 7' The property
rights of the decedent become harder to interpret and execute when there are
changes in circumstances that materially alter the way in which his or her origi-
nal consent may be carried out. 72
C. Post-Mortem Rights to Reproduce
The United States Constitution is read to protect one's right to repro-
duce, or one's decision to refrain from doing so. 3 The Supreme Court of the
United States has implied that the fundamental right to privacy covers the right
to procreate.7 4 Furthermore, in the landmark case of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,75 "the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional protection accorded
to a person's liberty interest relating to intimate relationships, the family, and
decisions about whether to beget or bear a child."76 Therefore, the constitution-
ally established right to reproduce is not in question, at least under traditional
forms of reproduction.
However, complications arise related to the right to reproduce after
death. Although the Supreme Court has recognized a protected right to repro-
70 Knaplund, supra note 6, at 651. One author suggests that if the decedent simply provides in
his or her will for the posthumously conceived child the uncertainty of intent could be cured.
Elliot, supra note 2, at 65. The author's illustrative, curative will provision is as follows: "'I here-
by devise, bequest, and bequeath fifty percent of my estate to my children. It is my express inten-
tion that that the term 'my children' include any children living and in existence at the time of my
death, and any biological children that may be conceived and born posthumously."' Id
71 Telephone Interview with Laurence C. Nolan, Professor of Law, Howard Univ. (Feb. 9,
2011).
72 Id. For example, assume that upon the decedent-donor's death he or she gave written con-
sent for a spouse to use his or her genetic material for posthumous conception. However, a num-
ber of years later the spouse remarries an infertile second husband or wife. The original spouse
decides to then use the original, deceased spouse's frozen genetic material for posthumous con-
ception. Although some persons may retain their consent towards their spouse using their genetic
material posthumously while remarried to another spouse, it is likely that many persons would not
feel the same. Therefore, the effect and control of the original consent given by the deceased
spouse to this new scenario is a morally conflicting question yet to be determined. Id.
7 See U.S. CONST. amends I, III, and IV; Elliot, supra note 2, at 55 ("'Procreative liberty' is a
broad term that encompasses a whole list of activities. At a minimum it includes the freedom to
reproduce and the freedom to avoid reproduction.").
74 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1985); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972).
7 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
76 Elliot, supra note 2, at 56 (emphasis added); see also Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 857.
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duce during one's life, there has not been an explicit recognition of this right
77post-mortem. It seems reasonable and equitable for children created by new
forms of reproductive technology to receive the same benefits and protection as
any other child created by other forms of reproduction. These children did not
choose the means by which they would be created and introduced into the
world. It would run against the current of social policy and the best interest of
the child to deny the posthumously conceived child the benefits and protections
received by all other children.78 Therefore, denial of a post-mortem right to con-
trol reproductive activity could result in external implications such that the deni-
al of a parent to posthumously control the use of his or her genetic material, and
establish the rights of its products, could negatively impact the resultant children
as well.79
D. Intestacy
Intestate distribution80 of a decedent's property is particularly difficult
when the heirs qualified to inherit are not in existence at the time of the dece-
dent's death. There are a small number of states that have enacted legislation
attempting to resolve who may inherit via intestacy in the context of posthum-
ous conception.8 However, these states' laws do not necessarily handle the is-
sues in the most reasonable fashion. Illustrative of the continued problems with-
in these statutes are those that place time limits on how long after the death of
the decedent a child may be born and still inherit. 82 The result of these restric-
7 Elliot, supra note 2, at 56. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly
acknowledged the parents' right to control the upbringing and education of their children. Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925). These cases, although specifically relating to the rights of the parents during their
lifetime, represent a general sentiment and policy of deference to the parents' control over their
children's upbringing, which should be carried out in the posthumously conceived child context
by recognizing the decedent's post-mortem procreative liberties. See generally Yoder, 406 U.S.
205.
78 See infra Part III.G.
7 The post-mortem right to reproduction implicates some of the concerns that Professor Nolan
emphasized regarding the care of the posthumously conceived children and who will take care of
them. Should a decedent be denied the right to reproduce posthumously, the parent-child relation-
ship is destroyed, effectively afflicting upon the state the duties of caring for the child. Telephone
Interview with Laurence C. Nolan, Professor of Law, Howard Univ. (Feb. 9, 2011).
80 Intestate distribution is the default mechanism by which a state distributes a decedent's
property to his qualifying heirs when the decedent leaves no will providing otherwise. The distri-
bution is conducted in accordance with the adopted statutory scheme for distribution within the
specific state (e.g., "Per Capita by the Generation," etc.). West Virginia adopts a "Per Capita by
the Generation" intestate succession scheme. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-2 (LexisNexis 2010).
81 See infra Part V.B.; see also Knaplund, supra note 6, at 636-42.
82 See Knaplund, supra note 6, at 637 (Louisiana statutes place a three-year limit within which
the posthumously conceived child must be born after the decedent-parent's death in order for him
or her to inherit via intestacy); see, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2011).
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tions is an often times arbitrary limitation on the posthumously conceived
child's right to inherit through intestacy, either directly from the decedent or
from other living relatives.83 Professor Nolan notes the inescapable problem of
time limits within statutes, explaining that such restrictions have the potential to
bar dependent children with no control as to the means of their creation from
receiving support.84
State intestacy laws and the posthumously conceived child's right to in-
herit through intestacy directly implicate defining who a "child" is under those
laws. Intestate succession, in this context, requires establishment of a parent-
child relationship between the posthumously conceived child and the decedent-
parent.8 5 Reference should be made to the relevant statute of the state within
which the decedent was domiciled in order to determine the technicalities and
precise definition of who qualifies as a "child" for inheritance purposes within
that state. An additional consideration in establishing the intestate inheritance
rights of posthumously conceived children is the time in which the child must
file a paternity action, should such action become necessary in establishing the
potential heir as a "child" under the provisions of the statute.8 7 As one commen-
tator noted:
In states that have not enacted specific legislation regarding
PMC children, general statutes of limitations on filing paternity
actions or claims against the estate may prevent PMC children
from making claims years after the decedent has died. In these
states, we need to inquire as to whether a state allows a paterni-
ty claim to be brought after the father's death, whether the sta-
tute of limitations to bring an action to inherit begins on the de-
cedent's death or is instead triggered by other events (such as
appointment of an executor or administrator, or publication of
notice to creditors), and how long the statute of limitations to
bring a claim runs.
83 Telephone Interview with Laurence C. Nolan, Professor of Law, Howard Univ. (Feb. 9,
2011).
84 Id. Professor Nolan further discussed the expansive reach of some of these statutes when the
posthumously conceived child disrupts the inheritance of children in being at the time of the death
of the decedent. Id. For further discussion and possible solutions, see infra Part VI.
8s See supra Part III.A.
86 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-1 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing definitions to be applied
under the "descent and distribution" scheme of the West Virginia Code). For additional discussion
on the inadequacies of the definitions provided within that statute, see infra Part VI.
87 See Lorio, supra note 1, at 159. The paternity action process and restrictions anse m con-
junction with the establishment of a "parent-child relationship." See supra Part III.A.
88 Knaplund, supra note 6, at 639-40.
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Although many states have not adopted statutes that specifically provide
for the intestacy inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children, there
are current uniform codes recommending the adoption of such provisions.89
These model codes even provide the policy behind certain provisions within the
statute, such as the reasoning for time limits.o
The aforementioned considerations are imperative because of the poten-
tial obstacles surrounding the extension of intestate inheritance rights to post-
humously conceived children. There exist other legal implications relating to the
posthumously conceived child and his or her intestate inheritance rights; how-
ever, the discussion included in this section provides a sufficient background for
one to place into context the exorbitant number of issues West Virginia must
consider in its deliberations over any related legislation in the future.
E. The Will and the Statutory Trust
One of the easiest mechanisms to avoid confusion and uncertainty as to
the posthumously conceived child's legal right to inherit is a provision for the
child in the decedent's will, with explicitly articulated intent to provide for the
child.9 1 Inclusion of a specific provision within the decedent's will evinces the
intent of the testator to provide for his or her posthumously conceived child. 92
The testator's intent is the controlling factor in the context of wills in-
terpretation and construction.93 Therefore, it is imperative that the testator in-
cludes a specific provision that provides for the possibility of a posthumously
conceived child when the testator has made his or her genetic material available
for post-mortem use. Inclusion of one of these provisions in a will prevents con-
fusion and uncertainty as to the testator's intentions to provide for the posthu-
mously conceived child. 94 Additionally, "[a]bsent this specificity in the will, it is
8 See infra Part V.C.
90 The 2008 comment to section 2-120(k) of the Uniform Probate Code provides in pertinent
part: "The 36-month period in subsection (k) is designed to allow a surviving spouse or partner a
period of grieving, time to make up his or her mind about whether to go forward with assisted
reproduction, and a reasonable allowance for unsuccessful attempts to achieve a pregnancy."
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) cmt. at 79 (2008).
91 Elliot, supra note 2, at 65; see also supra note 70 (providing a suggested, illustrative will
provision). One scholar presented an example for how one could most effectively prevent compli-
cations concerning the rights of their posthumously conceived child via their will: "[i]nclusion of
a phrase such as 'to my children, including whatever children are conceived or born before or
after my death from my frozen genetic material' has been suggested as inclusive phraseology."
Lorio, supra note 1, at 163.
92 In states that require the decedent's consent in order to establish a parent-child relationship,
the will provision seemingly would suffice as additional evidence of such.
93 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003).
94 See Lorio, supra note 1, at 163.
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unclear whether a posthumously conceived child could be included as a preter-
mitted heir."95
An alternative option for predictable and reliable disposition of the
rights of a posthumously conceived child is a non-probate form of transfer, such
as a trust: "[a]nother possibility is to create a statutory trust for any posthumous-
ly conceived child, allowing for the remainder of the estate to be administered
and distributed in a timely fashion."9 6 Today, non-probate forms of transfer are
an increasingly popular means of distributing a decedent's estate. 97 Therefore, it
is logical for a person to be able to rely on the same types of provisions that are
in wills, which specifically provide for inheritance rights of a posthumously
conceived child, to apply in inter vivos trusts and other non-probate forms of
transfer.
F. Social Security Benefits
Much of the case law related to posthumously conceived children's
rights involves the child's right to Social Security benefits from the deceased
parent. 98 The basic principles of Social Security eligibility are matters of federal
law that implicate certain state law provisions.9 Although the laws for defining
a surviving child (for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits) do impli-
cate state laws, the Supreme Court of the United States has set overriding
precedent for meeting a second requirement of demonstrating "dependency,'" 0
making this element one of federal concern.10 Posthumously conceived child-
ren are dependent on a deceased parent as much as any other child.
Social Security benefits are one means of supporting a child. As one
commentator predicts, there is the potential for constitutional attacks against the
denial of Social Security benefits to posthumously conceived children through
the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.102 Because the posthumously
9 Id.
96 Id.
9 See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1108 (1984) (explaining the decline in use of the probate system
and the rules of descent and distribution in the modem American system because of the increased
use of non-probate forms of transfer, such as the revocable trust).
9 See infra Part V.A.; Lorio, supra note 1, at 156 ("The issue of a posthumously conceived
child's right to inherit from his deceased father was first raised in 1993 in the context of a denial
of Social Security benefits.").
99 See supra Part II.C.2.
100 See Nolan, supra note 39, at 1100-01 (citing Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (dis-
cussing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C))).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1101. ("Thus, one may argue that under constitutional analysis this section of the Act
is unconstitutional since it does not accommodate this subclass of nonmarital [sic] children."); see
also U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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conceived child's right to inherit repeatedly implicates Social Security benefits,
states must strongly consider the ramifications of a posthumously conceived
child statue on this often vital support system.
G. The Child's Constitutional Right ofEqual Protection
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states from denying to any person within their jurisdictions 'the equal protection
of the laws.' Courts and commentators have interpreted this language as requir-
ing that similarly-situated individuals and groups be treated alike." 03 A state
must meet one of several "scrutiny" tests, depending on the type of its classifi-
cation, in order for differential treatment of a certain class to pass judicial re-
view.10 4 Therefore, differential treatment of posthumously conceived children
must pass a certain level of scrutiny, which is an additional consideration in any
disparate treatment a state may chose to afford them.
As proposed by one scholar, an ideal approach to the equal protection
rights of posthumously conceived children is an intermediate level of scruti-
ny. 05 This is an acceptable standard for deciding the rights of posthumously
conceived children concerning related state laws because of the children's "im-
mutable characteristic[s]."l 06 Because the child has no control over the post-
humous nature of its conception, it should not be legally deprived on the basis of
that immutable characteristic. Therefore, any state's differential treatment of this
class of children should meet a somewhat heightened standard of scrutiny 0 7 to
withstand judicial review.
Intermediate scrutiny is reasonable, and certainly equitable, especially
when viewed in light of the nearly invariable principle of placing the best inter-
est of the child above all else. 08 As stated by one author, "[w]ith new reproduc-
tive assistance technologies emerging every day, however, posthumous repro-
duction and the children created thereby should be afforded the same constitu-
103 Goodwin, supra note 5, at 242; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
104 Under the Equal Protection clause, the Supreme Court analyzes the type of differential
treatment a specific group receives through a state's action under one of three standards: 1) Ra-
tional Basis Test (lowest level of scrutiny), 2) Substantially Related to a Government Interest Test
(intermediate level scrutiny), and 3) Compelling Purpose Test (strict level scrutiny).
CHIMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 683-809 (also explains the different levels of scrutiny for differ-
ent classifications, as well as, information about the requirements of a "legitimate purpose" and
"reasonable relationship" in a state's differential treatment action).
105 Goodwin, supra note 5, at 245.
106 Id. at 245-46. The Supreme Court of the United States has utilized an intermediate level of
scrutiny when deciding the rights of illegitimate children, and has held that such a characteristic is
not within the control of the child. Therefore, the state must prove that its differential treatment
substantially relates to an important state interest. Id.; see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
518 (1976).
107 Mathews, 427 U.S. at 518; Goodwin, supra note 5, at 245.
1os Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 265 (Mass. 2002).
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tional protections that traditional reproductive methods and the children created
thereby receive."' 09 In determining what degree of legal recognition to afford
posthumously conceived children, West Virginia must strongly consider the
constitutional ramifications surrounding these children's creation and his or her
right to support.
H. The Rule Against Perpetuities, Anti-Lapse Statutes, and Pretermitted
Heir Statutes
"The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act and its re-
codification in the Uniform Parental Act of 2002 suggest in their respective
comments that parents can provide for posthumously conceived children in their
wills."110 Along with the ability to provide for one's posthumously conceived
children through a will comes the possibility of complications with latent, yet
lurking hazards. One such hazard is the Rule Against Perpetuities,"' which
aside from frustrating first year law students also presents itself in the context of
testate distribution to posthumously conceived children.
"[T]he common law Rule Against Perpetuities did not anticipate post-
humously conceived children."" 2 Under the traditional Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, devises to posthumously conceived children have the potential to violate
the Rule because the children could potentially be born more than twenty-one
years after the death of the testator, who creates the interest.113 Granted, many
states have adopted less stringent approaches to the Rule by means of the Wait-
and-See Doctrinell 4 or the Reformation Doctrine, also known as "cy pres."" 5
However, even with these measures in place there is the potential for the Rule to
cause unnecessary havoc in interpretation and construction of the testator's pro-
visions, due to unforeseen circumstances. One proposed solution is to make the
surviving spouse of the decedent, and other parent of the posthumously con-
109 Elliot, supra note 2, at 56. "'However, if the decision to bear a child is a constitutionally
protected choice, then it is logical. . . . that the manner in which the child is conceived, [either by
sexual intercourse or utilizing reproductive assistance], is also a constitutionally protected deci-
sion."' Id. (quoting Robert J. Kerekes, My Child ... But not my Heir: Technology Law and Post-
Mortem Conception, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 213, 227 (1996)).
110 Nolan, supra note 39, at 1098 (footnotes omitted).
II UNIF. STATUTORY R. AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 (West 1990).
112 Nolan, supra note 39, at 1099.
113 Id.
114 The "Wait-and-See Doctrine" permits a court to "wait and see" what happens with regards
to a potential violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, as opposed to the traditional approach of
assuming what "could" happen as causing a violation. The amount of time that a court will wait is
statutorily prescribed. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 900-02.
115 The "Reformation Doctrine," which is often called the "Doctrine of Cy Pres," is a method
by which a court will modify a will or trust "so as to carry out the testator's intent within the per-
petuities period" so that it does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Id. at 899.
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ceived child, the measuring life, thus preventing any child born of her from vi-
olating the Rule.116
Finally, West Virginia must also contemplate the entanglement of the
state's applicable pretermitted heir and anti-lapse statutes with the issue during
its debates over the appropriate measures to be taken with regards to posthu-
mously conceived children. However, aside from noting the necessity of being
addressed, no further discussion of those topics is included in this Note.
IV. HOME SWEET HOME: WHERE DOES WEST VIRGINIA STAND?
Now, with the appropriate foundational knowledge, it is possible to ana-
lyze where West Virginia sits with regards to its current Code and the posthu-
mously conceived child. The short of the matter is that West Virginia is no-
where, or so it would seem. Section 42-1-8 of the West Virginia Code 11 specif-
ically provides protection for the inheritance rights of the posthumously born
child, but not the posthumously conceived child."' Consequently, West Virginia
retains a gap within its Code' 19 in which there is an unpredictable and seemingly
hopeless disposition for the inheritance rights of the posthumously conceived
child.
Section 42-1-8 of the West Virginia Code provides as follows: "Any
child in the womb of its mother at, and which may be born after the death of the
intestate, shall be capable of taking by inheritance in the same manner as if such
child were in being at the time of such death." 20 Thus, West Virginia provides
statutory protection for the rights of the posthumously born child, if the child
was "in the womb of its mother" at the time of the decedent's death.12' Howev-
er, this provision clearly excludes from its protection the posthumously con-
ceived child for intestate inheritance purposes.
Questions arise when considering this statutory void. One might reason-
ably think that West Virginia purposefully omitted from the statute any specific
reference to the posthumously conceived child. However, upon exploration of
West Virginia's legislative history, model codes, other jurisdictions, and the
relatively recent presentation of related cases, it is inexcusable that West Virgin-
ia would not at least address the issue of providing intestate inheritance rights
122123for these children in some capacity, either in the positive 22 or the negative.
116 Id.
117 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2010).
1s Id.
l9 Id.
120 Id. (emphasis added).
121 Id.
122 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (2008) (example of a model statute that offers post-
humously conceived children intestate inheritance rights from their deceased parent).
123 Although not ideal, West Virginia could of course decide that the interests of the state, in
opposition to extending inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children, outweigh any
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Problems will inevitably arise when there is a complete lack of statutory consid-
eration given to an entire class of persons.
When considering the rising prevalence of posthumously conceived
children in modem society, 124 there is no excuse for West Virginia to intention-
ally or unintentionally omit from its Code any provision related to these child-
ren. Granted, it is possible that the state has in fact intentionally omitted them
from the Code. However, the want of an explicit provision leads to uncertainty
in statutory interpretation. If West Virginia desired to prohibit the posthumously
conceived child from inheriting from its deceased parent, it would be more ef-
fective to lucidly articulate that goal within the language of the statute. There-
fore, it is more likely that the state has simply not updated this Code section 2 5
in order to accommodate for the relatively recent developments related to post-
humously conceived children.
The legislative history of section 42-1-8, or the lack thereof, bolsters the
assertion that West Virginia has simply neglected to address the intestate inhe-
ritance rights of posthumously conceived children, as opposed to intentionally
omitting them from the statute. Unfortunately, section 42-1-8's legislative histo-
ry is scarce. Per usual in West Virginia, there is a dearth of House or Senate
reports within the relevant journals surrounding the years of the statute's adop-
tion that convey any substantive reasoning behind the statute's enactment.126
However, an assiduous search within each year's relevant West Virginia Code
section, as it passed through time, procured the origin of the statute and a meag-
er reason behind its one-time change in its West Virginia history. The current
section 42-1-8 has only changed one time since its original establishment in
West Virginia in 1882.127 In 1931 the legislature amended the statute's language
to its present articulation;128 that was the last time the statute has changed in
eighty years.
interests supporting extension of those rights. At least if the issue is statutorily addressed, there
will not be room for uncertainty in these cases.
124 Elliot, supra note 2, at 51.
125 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8.
126 H.D. 314, 1882 Leg., Adjourned Sess. (W. Va. 1882) (With no reasoning cited therein, this
only contains reference to the passing of an amended and re-enacted chapter seventy-eight. Chap-
ter seventy-eight was the original chapter in which current section 42-1-8 was found.); S. 314,
1882 Leg., Adjourned Sess. (W. Va. 1882) (only contains reference to the passing of the equiva-
lent bill sent from the House of Delegates with no reasoning cited therein). Before the adoption of
this statute in West Virginia, the line of legislative history traces itself back to the State of Virgin-
ia's statutory scheme, as far back as 1849. See VA. CODE 123-8 § (1849). It would seem that
West Virginia's adoption of the statute was a default adoption of the entire, related statutory con-
struction from the state of Virginia.
127 1882 W. Va. Acts 252 (original Act establishing a "posthumous children" statute under the
descent and distribution section in West Virginia's Acts).
128 W. VA. CODE § 42-1-8 (1931). The statute which was amended in 1931 adopted the exact
same articulation codified in the current West Virginia Code section 42-1-8: "Any child in the
womb of its mother at, and which may be born after, the death of the intestate, shall be capable of
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The implemented change occurred in 1931, which removed a ten month
time limit within which the child must be born after the decedent's death; how-
ever, it still required the child to be "in the womb of its mother" at the time of
the decedent's death.129 Lastly, the 1931 change reworded the French phrase "en
ventre sa mere" into its English equivalent, meaning "in the womb of its moth-
er."o30 A comment to the 1931 statute section explained that the reason for re-
moving the time limit was that it ran "contrary to scientific opinion."' 3' Fur-
thermore, the scientific component of the statute's alteration was provided in a
comment to a different section of the West Virginia Code section 36-1-13,32 of
that same year. The comment elaborated that because of scientific opinion, no
time limit should be affixed to the birth of the child.13 3 But removing the time
limitation and translating the French phrase into English are the only changes
made to the statute in eighty years.
These changes, however, only considered scientific development 3 4 for
posthumously born children, not posthumously conceived children, because of
the retention of the "in the womb of its mother" requirement. 35 Therefore, the
only change to the statute failed to accommodate for posthumously conceived
children. Nevertheless, based on this historical attempt to adapt to scientific
progression, one could argue that West Virginia maintains a policy of staying
current with developing technologies therefore making an immediate change to
the current statute imperative.' 36 The fact that there has only been one change to
this statute, made eighty years ago, provides overwhelming support for the cen-
tral contention of this Note: section 42-1-8 of the West Virginia Code is out of
date and needs substantial revision for the accommodation of posthumously
conceived children.
A deeper examination of the West Virginia Code lends no support to
finding accommodation for posthumously conceived children. Section 42-1-3(f)
taking by inheritance in the same manner as if such child were in being at the time of such
death"). Id.
129 Id. at reviser's note.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 W. VA. CODE § 36-1-13 (1931) (this section, entitled "Limitations Contingent Upon Death,"
falls under the general chapter "Estates in Property," and the comment briefly discusses the rea-
sons for redacting the time limit for children "in the womb of its mother" at the time of the dece-
dent's death).
'3 Id. at reviser's note (b).
134 The scientific opinion noted in the comments to the 1931 statute could not have possibly
contemplated posthumously conceived children because of the statute's retention of the "in the
womb of its mother" requirement. Thus, despite the commendable attempt to adapt to scientific
progress, these changes are out of date. Id.
13s W. VA. CODE § 42-1-8 (1931).
136 See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 531 (W. Va. 1995) (references section 42-1-8 of the
West Virginia Code as an example of West Virginia's purported policy of attempting to stay cur-
rent with scientific advancements).
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of the West Virginia Code provides for afterborn heirs. 137 This part of the Code
reads: "An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that
time if the individual lives one hundred twenty hours or more after birth."' 3 8
However, here too, complications arise with regards to posthumously conceived
children because, for inheritance purposes, the posthumously conceived child
cannot, by definition, be "in gestation" until after the death of the decedent par-
ent.'39 Therefore, the child will be precluded from inheriting, even if it does live
one hundred twenty hours after its birth.
Additionally, section 42-1-1(5) of the West Virginia Code defines des-
cendant as follows: "Descendant of an individual means all of his or her descen-
dants of all generations, with the relationship of parent and child at each genera-
tion being determined by the definition of child and parent contained in this
code." 4 0 A legal parent-child relationship, as discussed supra,14 1 must be estab-
lished in order for the child to inherit. Thus, according to section 42-1-1(5) of
the West Virginia Code, a posthumously conceived child in West Virginia must
establish a parent-child relationship in order to be considered a descendant of its
deceased parent for inheritance purposes.14 2 The problem of establishing the
parent-child relationship is particularly acute for the posthumously conceived
child in West Virginia, because even if the child establishes that relationship,
section 42-1-814 does not permit the otherwise valid "child"'" to inherit if it
was not in the womb of the mother at the time of the decedent's death.145
In West Virginia, there will inevitably be future chaos on the bench with
regards to deciding how best to interpret the current statute when a posthumous-
ly conceived child case presents itself. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-3(f) (LexisNexis 2010).
' Id. (emphasis added).
139 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 117.
140 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-1(5) (LexisNexis 2010). Also note, "'Heirs' means persons,
including the surviving spouse and the state, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate suc-
cession to the property of a decedent." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-1(16) (LexisNexis 2010). Addi-
tionally, "'Parent' includes any person entitled to take, or who would be entitled to take if the
child died without a will, as a parent under this code by intestate succession from the child whose
relationship is in question and excludes any person who is only a stepparent, foster parent or
grandparent." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-1(26) (LexisNexis 2010).
141 See supra Part III.A.
142 § 42-1-5.
143 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2010).
1" The term "child" is not specifically defined under the definitions section of the relevant code
section, § 42-1-1, despite reference to it (in relation to the parent-child relationship) in section 42-
1-1(5). Therefore, although a parent child relationship is purportedly required, an applicable
definition of "child" must be found in other related chapters of the Code and in relevant case law.
See, e.g., Sec. Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1967); Ramsey v.
Saunders, 172 S.E. 798 (W. Va. 1934); State v. Scarbrough, 150 S.E. 219 (W. Va. 1929); Cunn-
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Appeals, with inadequate statutory guidance, will be forced to adjudicate on this
type of case, creating case law on the matter. However, confusion and unpredic-
tability can be avoided if the legislature preemptively acts to promulgate a new,
or at least revised, statutory scheme accommodating for the rights of the post-
humously conceived child. This being so, it is time to look forward and decide
where the State needs to go with regards to handling the rights of these children.
V. LOOKING OUTSIDE: ANALYZING THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO
POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
Exploring some of the existing approaches to the posthumously con-
ceived child's dilemma establishes guidelines for West Virginia to base its deli-
berations on when promulgating a newly revised and comprehensive statute for
these children. The most effective mechanism for approaching this critical anal-
ysis involves a separate examination of select cases and statutes.
A. Case Law
Currently, very few jurisdictions have directly adjudicated on the rights
of a posthumously conceived child to inherit. Furthermore, the following cases
that are discussed are only a few of the most groundbreaking and persuasively
decided cases. Based on the selected cases, it is easier to comprehend the neces-
sary analysis a court must give to the problems confronted by the posthumously
conceived child. Comparison of case law is useful in its ability to provide the
reasoning conducted by other courts as they decided how best to deal with these
issues. There may not be one correct answer to the problem of balancing state
and personal interests; however, it is apparent that equity and the totality of the
circumstances play a role in a court's decision.146
These cases provide a foundation of knowledge that will be useful to the
legislature and the bench. Existing statutes, from foreign jurisdictions, often
times fall short of perfection. Thus, the existing body of case law provides addi-
tional considerations that can be synthesized with the existing model and foreign
statutes during debates over an appropriate approach to the dilemma, resulting
in a culmination of wisdom from which West Virginia may base its statute. A
combination of case law and statutory examples should be utilized when prom-
ulgating the new West Virginia rendition of the statute, escaping the deficien-
cies that would result should only one body of experience be relied upon.
1. Hecht v. Superior Courtl47
Before committing suicide in a Las Vegas hotel, the decedent stored fif-
teen vials of his genetic material at a sperm bank.148 He signed a release state-
146 See infra Part V.A. 1-3 and accompanying notes.
147 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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ment at the sperm bank, which authorized the release of his stored sperm to his
girlfriend, Deborah Hecht.14 9 The decedent died testate, bequeathing the sperm
to his girlfriend." 0 The decedent's will read, in relevant part, "I bequeath all
right, title, and interest that I may have in any specimens of my sperm stored at
any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to Deborah Ellen Hecht.""' Fur-
thermore, the decedent overtly expressed his intention that Ms. Hecht use his
sperm in a subsequent provision of the will, "It being my intention that samples
of my sperm will be stored at a sperm bank for the use of Deborah Ellen Hecht,
,,152
should she so desire. .. . Based on this bequest, Ms. Hecht sought to collect
the vials of sperm, over the objections of the decedent's surviving children from
a previous marriage.153
The court focused on the ownership interest that a decedent has in his
preserved genetic material, as well as his intention for the post-mortem use of
the material. 154 The court recognized the unique value of this case by explaining
that "[s]perm which is stored by its provider with an intent that it be used for
artificial insemination is thus unlike other human tissue because it is 'gametic
material' that can be used for reproduction . . . the value of sperm lies in its po-
tential to create a child after fertilization, growth, and birth."155 Therefore, the
court concluded that at the time of his death, the decedent maintains an owner-
ship interest in the use of his sperm for reproduction.156
The court continued its analysis with an elaboration on the decedent's
intention for the use of the preserved sperm.15 ' The decedent's intent to be-
queath the sperm to his girlfriend to be used, if she desired, for reproduction was
evinced through the specific provisions of the decedent's will.158 Therefore, the
decedent's wish, that his girlfriend receive his sperm for her use, may validly be
carried out based on the unambiguous intentions explicitly set forth in the
148 Id at 276.
149 Id. (The release statement, at the sperm bank, signed by the decedent, read in pertinent part:
"I, William Everett Kane, . . . authorize the [sperm bank] to release my semen specimens (vials) to
Deborah Ellen Hecht.").
150 Id. at 276.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 The interests of the children living at the time of the decedent's death are important to Pro-
fessor Nolan because of the potential for immediate need of their share of the decedent's estate.
Telephone Interview with Laurence C. Nolan, Professor of Law, Howard Univ. (Feb. 9, 2011); see
also infra Part VI.
154 Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280-81, 283-84.
155 Id. at 283 (citations omitted).
156 The court advanced its reasoning and conclusion by stating that the decedent's interest in his
sperm, at the time of his death, "constitute[s] 'property' within the meaning of' the state's probate
code. Id.
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will. 159 Finally, the court dictated another influential policy, by affirming a right
to utilize post-mortem artificial insemination. 160 The court based its conclusion
on the lack of public policy or statute to the contrary.16 1
The Hecht case illustrates the establishment of a decedent's post-
mortem right to control his or her gametic material.162 More importantly, the
court's reasoning in reaching its conclusions represents some of the important,
controlling factors that should influence legislatures in their attempts to codify a
means by which a decedent may validly provide for the post-mortem use of his
or her gametic material, and also the ability to effectively provide for the prod-
ucts of its use. The principles of ownership and intent are recurring themes in
this body of litigation, which cannot be taken lightly as "intent" alone serves as
a polestar principle in testate interpretation.' 63 West Virginia can use this case
for supporting the decedent's right to dispose of his genetic material, as well as
for him to provide for the products of it in the manner he deems most appropri-
ate when his intent is sufficiently established.
2. In re Estate of Kolacyl64
Twins that were posthumously conceived, and born almost eighteen
months after their father's death were held to be legal heirs for state intestacy
purposes.165 The decedent, like many other decedents in these cases, deposited
his sperm for preservation after being diagnosed with cancer. 16 6 Sadly, he died
at the age of twenty-six, leaving with his surviving wife the right to use his pre-
served sperm for reproductive purposes.167 More than eighteen months after the
death of the decedent, twins were born from his preserved genetic material.168
The surviving wife sought judicial declaration of the children being legal heirs
of their father's estate under New Jersey's intestacy statute.169 At that time, the
relevant statute in New Jersey granted no inheritance rights to the posthumously
159 Id.
160 Id. at 287-90.
161 Id. at 289-90 ("Decedent's adult children also fail to provide any legal or factual basis to
support their contention that the birth of a child through artificial insemination of Hecht with
decedent's sperm implicates their 'fundamental right to protection of their family integrity' .....
See also Elliot, supra note 2, at 58.
162 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287-90.
163 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003).
16 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
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conceived children, 70 which is similar to that of West Virginia's statute' 7' in
that no inheritance rights were accorded to posthumously conceived children. 17 2
Despite the lack of express reference to the rights of posthumously con-
ceived children, the court looked to what it believed was the actual intent of the
legislature in promulgating its current statute.17 3 Based on this approach, the
judge said he "discern[ed] a basic legislative intent to enable children to take
property from their parents and through their parents from parental relatives." 74
Furthermore, the judge elaborated on the reasoning by saying that the legisla-
ture's "general intent should prevail over restrictive, literal reading of statutes
which did not consciously purport to deal with the kind of problem before
US1175us ."7
Although the court came to an ultimate conclusion in favor of recogniz-
ing the children's inheritance rights, it did not do so without clearly expressing a
concern for the interests of third parties.' 76 The court recognized that the inter-
ests of the posthumously conceived children should, if possible, be protected;
however, if "doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other persons or
would cause serious problems in terms of the orderly administration of es-
tates[,]" then those outside interests must be given serious consideration as
well. 17
West Virginia's analogous statute 78 has yet to be interpreted in the
same context as the Kolacy case, but West Virginia should strive to mirror the
court's liberal interpretation of the statute, 17 9 capturing the intent of the legisla-
ture. 10 The court accorded more weight to the needs and rights of the children,
who are unable to change the means by which they were born,181 than to certain
170 Id. at 1260
1' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2010).
172 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1261.
17 After acknowledging the inadequacy of the state's current posthumous child intestacy sta-
tute, the court explained that "[s]imple justice requires us to do the best we can with the statutory
law which is presently available." Id. at 1261-62.
174 Id. at 1262.
n7 Id.
176 Id
'7 Id ("Estates cannot be held open for years simply to allow for the possibility that after born
children may come into existence. People alive at the time of a decedent's death who are entitled
to receive property from the decedent's estate are entitled to receive it reasonably promptly.").
This illustrates one of the precise concerns echoed by Professor Nolan. Telephone Interview with
Laurence C. Nolan, Professor of Law, Howard Univ. (Feb. 9, 2011).
17 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2010).
179 753 A.2d at 1262.
Iso Id.; see supra Part IV (discusses the intention of West Virginia, in its statutory scheme, to
remain current with scientific developments).
1 The court sympathetically expressed its concern for posthumously born children's rights
when it said, "once a child comes into existence, she is a full-fledged human being and is entitled
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administrative needs of the state. Ultimately, the court explicitly acknowledged
the need and suitability of the legislature to take charge in expressly speaking to
the specific needs of these children.18 2
3. Woodward v. Commissioner ofSocial Security'8 3
A surviving wife, who was artificially impregnated with her deceased
husband's sperm, attempted to claim Social Security benefits for the resulting
children.184 The court in this case held that posthumously conceived children
enjoy the same inheritance rights of naturally born children under Massachusetts
intestacy law if the surviving spouse established 1) the genetic, paternal rela-
tionship between the children and the decedent; and 2) that the decedent con-
sented to both reproducing posthumously and supporting the resultant child-
T .185ren.18
The court focused on "three powerful state interests: the best interest of
[the] children, the State's interest in the orderly administration of [the] estates,
and the reproductive rights of the genetic parent."' 86 The court expanded by
saying that its "task is to balance and harmonize these interests to effect the
Legislature's over-all purposes." 87
The best interest'8 8 of children, the certaintyl89 in estate administration,
and the intention and consent'90 of the decedent providing the gametic material
all serve as the overarching principles in the interpretation of these cases. Ulti-
mately, and what seems to be a recurring theme, the court decided in favor of
protecting the interests of the children, notwithstanding any deficiencies within
the current state statute; this is a theme West Virginia should adopt.'9 ' However,
to all of the love, respect, dignity and legal protection which that status requires." In re Estate of
Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1263 (emphasis added).
182 Id. at 1261.
183 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
184 Id. at 260.
1ss Id. at 259.
186 Id. at 265.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 266.
190 Id. at 269. See also In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 212 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. N.Y. 2007).
That court held that posthumously conceived children qualify as heirs because "a sympathetic
reading of these instruments warrants the conclusion that that Grantor intended all members of his
bloodline to receive their share." Id. (emphasis added).
191 The Woodward court noted that "the legislature has expressed its will that all children be
'entitled to the same rights and protections of the law' regardless of the accidents of their birth."
760 N.E.2d at 265 (quotations omitted). See also Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting a liberal interpretation of the term "child" in acknowledg-
ing posthumously conceived children as being "children" within the meaning of the Social Securi-
ty Act's surviving child's insurance benefits provision).
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this is not to suggest that the opposite cannot be decided, based on a statutory
interpretation favoring the state's interest of certainty and orderly administration
of estates over the child's interests. 192
West Virginia has before it a colossal task. As expressed by other juris-
dictions having already adjudicated on the matter, "there is a need for compre-
hensive legislation to resolve the issues raised by advances in biotechnology."19 3
West Virginia, like many of the state courts from the cases discussed herein,
lacks sufficient legislation to resolve the multifaceted issues surrounding the
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children. However, as is evident
from other state's cases, there are recurring themes that seem to serve as poles-
tars to interpretation and construction of the rights of these unique, yet ever
more prevalent, group of children. 194
B. A Point of Reference: On-Point Statutes from Other Jurisdictions
As of the spring of 2010, there were twelve states with enacted legisla-
tion specifically geared toward posthumously conceived children. 19 5 Of those
twelve statutes, only a few have been selected for detailed analysis in order to
thoroughly explore the intricacies and ramifications of those promulgations.
Furthermore, selecting a limited number of state statutes is equally useful be-
cause many of the statutes are similarly constructed.
An attempt is made to present statutes that illustrate recurring themes of
interpretation and construction relied on in the above-mentioned cases.1 96 It is
upon these guiding principles that West Virginia can rest its ultimate conclusion
on how best to resolve the legislative deficiencies currently at large in the state.
Based on the examples provided below, West Virginia will more efficiently
192 Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011) (denying posthumously conceived child
Social Security benefits based on the language of state statutes); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49
(4th Cir. 2011) (a case close to home for West Virginia, where the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals adopted a strict construction of Virginia's posthumously conceived child statute in denying
Social Security benefits to a posthumously conceived child born several years after the statute's
ten month limitation); Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (denying the inhe-
ritance rights of a posthumously conceived child under Arkansas's intestacy statutes); Stephen v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2005). See also Lorio, supra note 1, at
158-59.
193 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
194 There are currently a handful of additional relevant cases supporting the recognition of
posthumously conceived children's rights to intestate inheritance. See, e.g., Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
195 Wood, supra note 33, at 890-91. Although this Note only explores the provisions of a select
number of states, the remaining states' statutory provisions are of course useful in understanding
the possible routes to be taken with regards to this class of children. The comprehensive list of
states includes: California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. For the relevant statute sections for each of these
states, see infra notes 188-209.
196 See supra Part V.A. 1-3 and accompanying notes.
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conduct legislative debates concerning posthumously conceived children be-
cause of its ability to compare the costs and benefits of different states' ap-
proaches to the posthumously conceived child issue. Each representative state
statute, and the states with similar statutory schemes, is listed in separate sec-
tions below, starting with the restrictive approach assumed by Florida.
1. Florida
Florida's posthumously conceived child statute reads as follows:
A child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or per-
sons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or
preembryos to a woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim
against the decedent's estate unless the child has been provided
for by the decedent's will. 19 7
Florida's statute represents a restrictive approach 9 8 because it specifi-
cally requires testate disposition of a posthumously conceived child's right to
inherit from the deceased parent, if the child was not in the woman's body be-
fore the death of the decedent.199 This means the deceased parent must provide,
in his or her will, for the posthumously conceived child. This statutory scheme
offers some, but not complete, protection for the child.200 In a perfect world, all
children would be equally protected in their attempts to receive support from
their parents; however, not all children are produced through the same mechan-
isms, requiring adjustments in the disposition of their rights in intestacy.
In Florida, special emphasis is placed on the intent of the parent, 2 0 ' be-
cause the provisions within one's will require an affirmative, intentional action
on the part of the testator to provide for those specific beneficiaries. Denial of
intestate inheritance rights exemplifies a state interest and preference towards
certainty and efficient closure of the deceased parent's estate. Although the
Florida statute does permit testate inheritance, its denial of any intestate inherit-
ance by the posthumously conceived child may be subject to constitutional chal-
lenge as discussed previously.202 Another consideration brought to light through
Florida's statute is whether a posthumously conceived child will qualify as a
beneficiary under a will that makes a class gift, if the class gift only articulates a
19 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (LexisNexis 2011).
198 Ohio's statute is another example of a state adopting an extremely restrictive view of the
posthumously conceived child's right to inherit. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (LexisNexis
2011) (completely barring from intestate inheritance any child not in existence or in gestation at
the time of the decedent's death).
19 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4).
200 Id
201 Id
202 See supra Part III.G.
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bequest to "children" generally, never explicitly referring to posthumously con-
ceived children.203
Florida's relevant statute204 is specifically included in this Note for pur-
poses of contrast from other states because it answers the question of whether a
posthumously conceived child can inherit from the deceased parent narrowly.
Although this Note argues for a fairly broad acknowledgement of the posthu-
mously conceived child's right to inherit in most circumstances, that view is by
no means the only one. Therefore, it is of equal importance for West Virginia to
consider the policy and consequences behind not permitting the posthumously
conceived child to inherit except in very narrow circumstances.205 The repre-
sentative statute of the next state, Virginia, assumes an increasingly intricate
scheme.
2. Virginia
Virginia's relevant code section provides:
Death of spouse. --Any child resulting from the insemination of
a wife's ovum using her husband's sperm, with his consent, is
the child of the husband and wife notwithstanding that, during
the ten-month period immediately preceding the birth, either
party died.
However, any person who dies before in utero implantation of
an embryo resulting from the union of his sperm or her ovum
with another gamete, whether or not the other gamete is that of
the person's spouse, is not the parent of any resulting child un-
less (i) implantation occurs before notice of the death can rea-
sonably be communicated to the physician performing the pro-
cedure or (ii) the person consents to be a parent in writing ex-
ecuted before the implantation.2 06
Virginia takes a more convoluted approach in its statutory design,
through a variety of statutorily prescribed responses to different circums-
tances.2 07 The posthumously conceived child may inherit when there is written
consent by the deceased parent.2 08 This requirement is in accord with the other
states adopting a similar requirement. However, Virginia's statute makes a de-
203 See Goodwin, supra note 5, at 260.
204 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4).
205 Id.
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tailed effort in providing guidance for various circumstances that may arise con-
cerning posthumous children generally. The statute is an "all-in-one" statutory
approach, with the posthumous conception provision embedded within the over-
all statute.209 Virginia also places a ten month time restriction on the rights of a
posthumous child by means of an entirely separate statute,2 lo which is unique in
this state's statutory design.
West Virginia should take from this statute the benefit of providing spe-
cific provisions for varying circumstances (e.g., tardy notice of decedent's death
to the physician21 1), but also the potential negative results of such actions be-
cause of the restrictive function those provisions perform. Virginia's statute also
places a time limit on the child,212 which acts to potentially deprive the child of
the inheritance it could receive, and may need, upon its delayed birth.2 13 Contin-
uing the present discussion of restrictively oriented statutes, Louisiana
represents an additional example of these intricate designs.
3. Louisiana
Louisiana's relevant statute reads:
A. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary,
any child conceived after the death of a decedent, who specifi-
cally authorized in writing his surviving spouse to use his ga-
metes, shall be deemed the child of such decedent with all
rights, including the capacity to inherit from the decedent, as the
child would have had if the child had been in existence at the
time of the death of the deceased parent, provided the child was
born to the surviving spouse, using the gametes of the decedent,
within three years of the death of the decedent.
B. Any heir or legatee of the decedent whose interest in the suc-
cession of the decedent will be reduced by the birth of a child
conceived as provided in Subsection A of this Section shall
209 Id
210 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (2011) (requires any child born of a decedent parent be born within
ten months of the decedent's death for inheritance purposes); see also Wood, supra note 33, at
891-92.
211 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(B)(i).
212 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164.
213 See, e.g., Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011) (recent case where the Court of
Appeals affirmed this Note's prediction of potentially negative results for the posthumously con-
ceived child by adopting a strict construction of Virginia's posthumously conceived child statute
in denying Social Security benefits to a posthumously conceived child born several years after the
statute's ten month limitation).
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have one year from the birth of such child within which to bring
an action to disavow paternity. 2 14
Louisiana, like Virginia, sets forth detailed requirements in order for a
posthumously conceived child to inherit from its parents. 15 Louisiana, and any
other state articulating copious requirements to be met in order for a posthu-
mously conceived child to inherit, resolves the problems of predictability and
certainty in the state's favor. Through an intricate set of requirements, Louisiana
provides the state a high degree of predictability, while also establishing a
means by which the posthumously conceived child might inherit and receive
other benefits as well.
West Virginia must be cautious, however, in navigating these highly re-
gulated waters because of the potential for eliminating certain children from
support because of requirements too stringently enforced and prescribed. How-
ever, by way of detailed statutory instruction, Louisiana serves as a superb ex-
ample of a state providing recourse for a disgruntled third party whose share of
inheritance is disturbed by the arrival of a posthumously conceived child.216
West Virginia now has an example 2 17 upon which to base its own form of dis-
course for already living children, if it should decide to so provide. The next
representative state, Colorado, adopts a more liberal statutory scheme.
4. Colorado
Colorado's relevant statute reads as follows:
If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos,
the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless
the deceased spouse consented in a record that if the assisted
reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse
would be a parent of the child.218
Colorado, like many states, 219 adopts the Uniform Parentage Act's (he-
reinafter "UPA") version 2 20 of the posthumously conceived child statute. By
214 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2011).
215 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(B) (2011). California serves as an additional example (to an ex-
treme) of a state requiring explicit, detailed requirements for a posthumously conceived child to
inherit from its deceased parent. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2011) (California's statute even
requires that the decedent's designated person to control the genetic material be notified by certi-
fied mail).
216 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:39 1.1(B).
217 Id.
218 COLo. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(8) (2011).
219 Seven states have adopted the UPA's model statute (or very similar renditions) within their
own codes. The six states, in addition to Colorado include Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-
707 (2011)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (2011)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
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adopting the UPA's articulation, Colorado's statute and other similar statutes
represent a simplistic mechanism for accommodating the needs of the posthu-
mously conceived child because the UPA sets forth an easy-to-follow model for
states to quickly incorporate within their own codes. 2 21 By simply requiring that
the decedent provide consent to be the parent of the child, these statutes permit a
liberal statutory scheme. The statute contemplates caring for posthumously con-
ceived children in most circumstances so long as the decedent gave consent, and
there is not some other restrictive intestacy statute within the state, etc. This
kind of provision for the child in this capacity represents extreme protection and
support, but these statutes admittedly do not necessarily consider valid, counter-
vailing interests of the state and third parties. A middle ground approach should
222be aspired to by West Virginia.
C. The Standard: Model and Uniform Codes
There are model codes by which many states have based their own ver-
sion of a posthumously conceived child statute on model codes. 22 3 A review of
these models provides a thorough and scholarly foundation upon which West
Virginia might base its own statute, or at least formulate potential ideas for parts
of its statutory scheme. This discussion starts with the Uniform Probate Code's
rendition.
1. Uniform Probate Code
The Uniform Probate Code provides:
If under this section, an individual is a parent of a child of as-
sisted reproduction who is conceived after the individual's
death, the child is treated as in gestation at the individual's
death for purposes of Section 2-104(a)(2) if the child is: (1) in
utero not later than 36 months after the individual's death; or
(2) born not later than 45 months after the individual's death.224
160.707 (West 2011) (adding only one additional requirement: the decedent's consent must be
held by a licensed physician)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (LexisNexis 2011)); Wash-
ington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.730 (West 2011)); and Wyoming (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-
2-907 (2011)). See also Wood, supra note 33, at 890-91.
220 See infra Part V.C.2.
221 Id
222 See infra Part VI.
223 See supra notes 218, 219 and accompanying text.
224 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (2008).
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The Uniform Probate Code requires specific time limits within which
the child must be born or conceived. 2 25 The time limits serve state interests
while still permitting the posthumously conceived child to inherit should it be
born within the specified time parameters. Although there are time limits, which
serve state interests, the model statute provides some form of inheritance and
support protection for the posthumously conceived child. However, the same
potential problems related to time limits on the ability of a posthumously con-
ceived child to inherit are identical to those discussed in relation to Virginia's
time sensitive statute, discussed above.226 Because there are in fact potential
problems related to placing time limits on the posthumously conceived child,
the discussion of the UPA's model statute (with no time limits) in the next sec-
tion is useful.
2. Uniform Parentage Act227
The UPA provides:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by as-
sisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting
child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased in-
dividual would be a parent of the child.22 8
Aside from being the model upon which many states base their posthu-
mously conceived children statutes,229 the UPA provides one of the more lenient
versions of this type of statute. By simply requiring the written consent of the
deceased parent, this model provides expansive protection for the child. 23 0 Ade-
quate protection of the posthumously conceived children's right to inherit is
crucially important. Nevertheless, it is equally important to not let over-zealous
225 Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (2011).
226 See supra Part V.B.2. Professor Nolan expanded on some of the potential problems of im-
posing time limits that the state and decedent may never have contemplated. One such example is
the possibility that the decedent has given full consent for use of the genetic material post-mortem.
However, the surviving spouse attempts to use the genetic material, in a timely manner, but the
implantation process fails to work until after the time restriction has surpassed. This presents the
unique issue of a surviving spouse attempting to utilize the material within the time limits, but it
simply is not successful until afterwards. Telephone Interview with Laurence C. Nolan, Professor
of Law, Howard Univ. (Feb. 9, 2011).
227 The Uniform Parentage Act is what the majority of states adopting posthumously conceived
children statutes base their own constructions off of. See supra notes 224, 225 and accompanying
text.
228 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
229 Id.; see supra notes 221-227 and accompanying text.
230 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707.
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protection of these children blind West Virginia from recognizing the state's
interests of efficient closure of estates, and avoiding disturbance of the shares of
children living at the time of the decedent's death.
The model codes, representative state statutes, and case law concerning
posthumously conceived children convey an expansive set of attitudes and ap-
proaches to the dilemma. West Virginia should be sufficiently equipped with
scholarly and experiential references upon which to base its own revision to
section 42-1-8 of the West Virginia Code.231
VI. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION: WHERE DOES WEST VIRGINIA Go Now?
West Virginia may find consolation in the fact that only a minority of
states have formally addressed the needs of posthumously conceived child-
ren. 2 32However, the time has come for West Virginia to more appropriately pro-
vide protection for the children resulting from new age technology. Granted, the
state maintains its own interests in this issue, such as efficient closure of estates
upon a decedent's death and providing certainty for living heirs. However, the
best interest of the posthumously conceived children and the equal protection
that must be afforded to all of them ought rise above any other countervailing
concerns when deciding on the result of the posthumously conceived child legis-
lation in West Virginia.
There are colorful arguments for West Virginia to assume the position
of states such as Colorado or Delaware, providing protection for the children
with minimal restrictions, such as a simple written consent.233 Conversely,
equally persuasive arguments exist for following the highly regulated and con-
voluted schemes within states such as Louisiana and California.2 34 However,
this Note, based on a thoughtful analysis of the history of this topic and consid-
eration of Professor Nolan's concerns,235 argues that a middle-road approach
should be adopted in West Virginia. West Virginia should adopt a posthumously
conceived children statutory scheme that sets certain limits, while being careful
not to over regulate the process, which might lead to unintentional denial to
these children of intestate inheritance rights.
Therefore, West Virginia should promulgate a statute that adopts and
synthesizes provisions and concepts from the UPA,2 36 the Louisiana statute,m
231 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2010).
232 See supra note 186.
233 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(8) (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2011); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 707; see also supra notes 163, 164 and accompanying text.
234 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2011); see also
supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
235 Telephone Interview with Laurence C. Nolan, Professor of Law, Howard Univ. (Feb. 9,
2011).
236 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707.
237 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1.
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and the New Jersey case of In re Estate of Kolacy.238 The UPA's requirement of
written consent and its lack of a time restriction 23 9 are imperative because of the
undeniable proof of the decedent's intent and its accommodation of a child who
cannot help how long after its parent's death it is born. 2 40 However, this alone
will not be enough to deal with all of the related issues. Louisiana's separate
provision that offers recourse for already existing children when a posthumously
conceived child disturbs their shares is novel. 24 1 Louisiana provides for the inhe-
ritance rights of posthumously conceived children, but not without recognizing
third party interests as well.242 However, the means by which Louisiana protects
already existing children is less than perfect.
Based on a persuasive discussion with Professor Nolan,243 already exist-
ing children should be given full protection of their shares of inheritance re-
ceived at the time of decedent's death, by not permitting a posthumously con-
ceived child to inherit directly from the decedent himself.244 Nevertheless, the
child will be accorded full rights as a collateral and heir of the decedent under
West Virginia's intestate distribution scheme,24 5 permitting it to inherit from all
other living members of the decedent's family. Although not inheriting directly
from the decedent, the child is still receiving adequate support via any other
form of inheritance, as well as, being fully eligible for any other support bene-
fits, based on the written consent establishing a valid parent-child relation-
ship.246 This type of provision fully appreciates existing children's rights as well
as the state's interest in efficient closure of estates.
Obviously, this perspective is not the only one, but it does provide fair
and equitable protection to a class of children with an immutable characteristic:
the posthumous means of their conception.247 Additionally, a statute with these
provisions would provide adequate notice to the state of a potential future bene-
ficiary, permit efficient closure of estates, and provide relief to the already liv-
ing children of the decedent. It is now up to the legislature, and possibly the
238 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
239 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707.
240 For a relevant example of why a child might be bom outside of some state's time restric-
tions, but still being in need of support, see supra note 224.
241 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(B).
242 Id
243 Telephone Interview with Laurence C. Nolan, Professor of Law, Howard Univ. (Feb. 9,
2011).
244 Id.
245 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-2 (LexisNexis 2010).
246 Providing specific, clearly articulated, statutory protection for a posthumously conceived
child is more imperative than ever based on the recent decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In Schaffer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011), the Fourth Circuit effectively took the
stance of strict statutory construction in a posthumously conceived child case.
247 See supra Part 1I.G.
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West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, to efficiently and responsibly handle
this vexing matter.
VII. CONCLUSION
The time is now for the state of West Virginia to revise its archaic, eigh-
ty-year-old posthumous child statute in light of new age technology. The law
related to the posthumously conceived child is lacking consideration in most
states. However, as case law proves, the issues are evolving and will only grow
more complex. Therefore, whether West Virginia adopts the model codes' sug-
gestions, another states' attempted promulgation, or best yet, the proposal made
in this Note, any step towards resolving the issue will prevent future headaches
for the parties, the bench, and the legislature in trying to apply old law to new
issues.
As West Virginia begins its legislative process on this issue it should
keep in mind the advice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court:
As these technologies advance, the number of children they
produce will continue to multiply. So, too, will the complex
moral, legal, social, and ethical questions that surround their
birth. The questions present in this case cry out for lengthy,
careful examination outside the adversary process, which can
only address the specific circumstances of each controversy that
presents itself. They demand a comprehensive response reflect-
ing the considered will of the people.2 4 8
West Virginia has before it an important task. The controlling policy
behind, and the balanced interests of the child, the parent, and the state must be
accorded their due consideration regarding the matters set forth herein sooner
rather than later.
Andrew S. Felts
248 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002).
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